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ARGUMENT
The arguments contained in this Reply Brief are limited to
those issues raised on Cross-Appeal by Defendants Sam Peebles and
Harold Peebles.1
I.

THE JURY ERRED IN FINDING THAT BROOKSIDE'S REFUSAL TO
ALLOW MS. SOUTHWORTH TO SUBMIT AN APPLICATION FOR
RESIDENCY WAS NOT UNREASONABLE

The jury erred in finding that Brookside's refusal to accept
an application for residency from Ms. Southworth was not an
1

Appellant raises two new issues in its reply brief.
Appellant first argues that "Sam Peebles refused to sign a
written lease with Brookside, as required by the [Mobile Home
Park Residency Act]," and therefore he should be denied "the
benefits provided by the Act." (Appellant's Reply Brief at 10)
(citation omitted). The record shows, however, that the only
reason Sam Peebles declined to sign a third lease with the Park
is because he had also signed two previous leases. (Question:
"Did you refuse to sign a new lease?" Peebles: "I never was
presented one. [Jim Prentice] asked me if I would sign one. I
told him I don't see why I need to. I'm already paying rent and
I'm already under a lease so I never was presented with one
again." Sam Peebles Dep. At 3 6.) The record also shows that the
jury found that Peebles had a written lease for space #100 that
had never been surrendered. Moreover, because Appellant did not
raise this issue below or in its initial brief to this Court, the
issue is waived.
Appellant next argues that section 57-16-15.1 applies to
this case. (Appellant's Reply Brief at 15.) That section,
however, applies only to nonpayment of rent following a notice
pursuant to section 57-16-6(2)(d), and to behavior that
"substantially endangers" the "security and health" of other
residents. The complaint did not seek evictions on section 5716-6(2) (d) grounds. No notice pursuant to 57-16-6(2) (d) was
served. And no evidence on this basis was presented at trial.
In short, section 57-16-15.1 is inapplicable and, even if it was
applicable, the issue is waived because Appellant failed to raise
the issue below or in its initial brief to this Court.
1

"unreasonable withholding'' of approval of residency under the
Mobile Home Park Residency Act.

As a matter of law, refusal to

accept an application for residency from a prospective resident
is a per se violation of section 57-16-4(4), which prohibits a
mobile home park owner from "unreasonably withholding" approval
for residency.
In its Reply Brief, Brookside does not dispute that Jim
Prentice, the Brookside mobile home park manager, refused to
accept an application for residency from Jackie Southworth or
that he refused to meet with her.

Ms. Southworth had made an

appointment to meet with Jim Prentice, fill out an application
for residency and review her financial information, among other
things.

When she arrived, Jim Prentice testified that he "told

her she had been denied by the owner" and he sent her away.

(T.

at 616, lines 18-19.)
Brookside made the following arguments in its Reply Brief as
to why the foregoing was not an "unreasonable withholding" of
approval for residency within meaning of section 57-16-6.

First,

Brookside argued that Western Credit could not verify Ms.
Southworth's employment income and therefore, presumably,
Brookside had no duty to meet with Ms. Southworth or permit her
to fill out an application.

Second,' Brookside claimed that Jim

Prentice testified that he did not "see" Ms. Southworth's tax
2

returns with her at the time he advised her that she had been
denied residency by the owner of the park.

Third, Brookside

contended that Peebles failed to preserve this issue at trial
because Peebles did not introduce Ms. Southworth's tax returns
into evidence.

Finally, Brookside asserted that Peebles failed

to sufficiently "marshal the evidence."

None of these arguments

is sufficient to refute Defendants' argument that Brookside's
actions constituted an "unreasonable withholding" within the
meaning of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act.
A.

Western Credit's Inability To Verify Ms.
Southworth's Employment Does Not Justify Brookside's
Refusal To Allow Ms. Southworth The Opportunity To
Submit Her Financial Information To Brookside

Brookside cites to portions of the trial transcript wherein
Ms. Southworth acknowledges that Western Reporting was unable to
verify her employment or her account with Utah First Credit.2
Nevertheless, just because Western Credit was unable to verify
Ms. Southworth's employment, Ms. Southworth should not have been
prevented from submitting her financial information to Brookside.
Ms. Southworth owned her own business.
2

Ms. Southworth testified

"In the testimony of Ms. Southworth, she acknowledged that
her credit report from Western Reporting states that Western
Reporting was unable to verify her employment though the
employment was at a company she owned."
(Appellant's Reply Brief
at 18) (citation omitted). "Ms. Southworth also acknowledged
that her credit report from Western Reporting indicate [sic] that
Western Reporting was unable to verify her account at Utah First
Credit." Id. at 19 (citation omitted).
3

that "I would not allow any of my bank, or person [nel] to verify
anything to anyone without [the] okay from me."
lines 23-24.)

(T. at 3 07,

Because Ms. Southworth would not allow any of her

banks or personnel to verify anything without her okay, she was
prepared to "verify [her income] by tax returns at any time."
(T. at 3-0 8, lines 4-5.)

Furthermore, at the time Ms. Southworth

went to meet: with Jim Prentice, she had the credit information
with her and she was prepared to discuss it with Jim Prentice:
Q.

You said that you'd had with you the credit information
we looked at?

A.

Exactly.

Q.

And were you going to review that with [Jim Prentice]?

A.

Yes, I was, as well as fill out the application for the
park.

Q.

Okay.

A.

I never got my foot in the door.

And you didn't have an opportunity to do that?

(T. at 313, lines 10-18.)
Brookside makes the very point that Peebles is making.
Western Credit could not verify Ms. Southworth's financial
information.

Ms. Southworth should have had the opportunity to

provide Brookside her credit information.

Ms. Southworth stood

ready and willing to provide that credit information, but Ms.
Southworth had already been "denied by the owner."

It was

unreasonable for Brookside to reject Ms. Southworth based solely
4

on Western Credit's lack of verification.

It is undisputed that

Jim Prentice refused to meet with Ms. Southworth, refused to take
an application from Ms. Southworth, and refused to allow Ms.
Southworth to present her financial information.

Such behavior

constitutes a per se "unreasonable withholding" of approval for
residency under section 57-16-4(4) of the Mobile Home Park
Residency .Act.
B.

Prentice's Testimony That He Did Not See Ms.
Southworth's Tax Returns In Her Hand Is Irrelevant

Mr. Prentice's testimony that he did not see Ms.
Southworth's tax returns in her hand is irrelevant. What Ms.
Southworth may have had in her hand and what Mr. Prentice saw (or
didn't see) in her hand is irrelevant since Ms. Southworth had
already been "denied by the owner" as a resident of the mobile
home park.

(T. at 616, line 18.)

Therefore, it is irrelevant

what papers Ms. Southworth had with her since she had already
been denied.

Furthermore, because Jim Prentice refused to meet

with Ms. Southworth, he had no opportunity to see what papers she
had with her or what papers she could provide at a later time.
Ms. Southworth also testified that she could "verify [her income]
by tax returns at any time."

(T. at 308, lines 4-5.)

5

C.

Peebles Was Not Required To Tender Ms. Southworth's
Tax Returns Into Evidence To Prove Brookside
"Unreasonably Withheld" Approval For Residency
Within The Meaning Of Section 57-16-6

Brookside argues that u[t]he Peebles did not tender Ms.
Southworth's tax returns into evidence to rebut Brookside's basis
for denying her application and so the issues [sic] has [sic] not
been preserved on appeal."

(Appellant's Reply Brief at 20.)

Neither of these arguments is true.
i.

The information on Ms. Southworth's tax returns is
irrelevant

Brookside argues that "Pebbles did not tender Ms.
Southworth's tax returns into evidence to rebut Brookside's
for denying her application."
(Emphasis added).

basis

(Appellant's Reply Brief at 20.)

This argument makes no sense.

First, Ms.

Southworth was never permitted to fill out an application for
residency; so there was no "application"
Second, the "basis"

to deny.

for Brookside denying Ms. Southworth the

opportunity to fill out an application was Western Credit's
inability to verify Ms. Southworth's employment.

Alan Glover,

the owner of the Park, testified that he had rejected Ms.
Southworth because Western Credit had been "unable to verify
employment."

(T. at 70.)

Accordingly, the "basis"

for Brookside rejecting Ms.

Southworth had nothing to do with Ms. Southworth's tax returns or
6

other financial information.
irrelevant.

Ms. Southworth's tax returns were

This is demonstrated by the fact that Brookside

would not even consider Ms. Southworth's tax returns or other
financial information.

Brookside did not care.

income or assets did not matter to Brookside.

Ms. Southworth's
Brookside's

decision was based not on Ms. Southworth's actual financial
condition, but on what Western Credit could "verify."
Furthermore, had Peebles tendered Ms. Southworth's actual
tax returns, bank statements and financial statements into
evidence at trial, as Brookside argues Peebles should have done,
those documents would have been properly excluded as
u

irrelevant."
ii.

Peebles was not required to tender Ms.
Southworth's tax returns into evidence to
preserve for appeal the issue of whether
Brookside had "unreasonably withheld" approval

As discussed above, Peebles was not required to tender Ms.
Southworth's tax return into evidence since that information was
irrelevant to Brookside's rejection of Ms. Southworth.

Brookside

refused to even meet with Ms. Southworth or to review any of her
financial information, be it tax returns or otherwise that she
might have provided to them.

Furthermore, Estate of Morrison v.

West One Trust Co., 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), which

7

Brookside cites in its Reply Brief,3 is inapposite.
Morrison was an estate case.
background of case).

Estate of

933 P.2d at 1016 (providing

It had nothing to with a mobile home park.

Moreover, unlike Estate of Morrison, Defendants in this case have
not "introduce[d] . . . entirely new arguments" on appeal.
at 1018.

Id.

Rather, the issues which Defendants raise here and

elsewhere have been preserved for appeal and they are therefore
correctly before this Court.
D.

Peebles Has Marshaled The Evidence

Finally, Brookside asserts that Pebbles has failed to
marshal the evidence.
the evidence.

This is not true.

Peebles has marshaled

In its Opposing Memorandum, Brookside has failed

to cite a single piece of evidence that is inconsistent with
Peebles' theory of this case.

It is undisputed that Brookside

refused to meet with Ms. Southworth or accept an application from
her.

It is also undisputed that Ms. Southworth stood ready and

willing to provide her tax returns and other financial
information to Brookside.
The Mobile Home Park Residency Act provides that "approval"
of a prospective purchaser of a mobile home who intends to become
a resident may not be "unreasonably withheld."

3

For Brookside to

See Appellant's Reply Brief at 20 (citing Estate of
Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah [Ct.] App. 1997)).
8

refuse to even meet with or accept an application from a
prospective purchaser is "unreasonable" as a matter of law.
Brookside's actions in this case attempt to override the
overall purpose of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, which
states:
The fundamental right to own and protect
land and to establish conditions for its
use by others necessitate[s] that the
owner of a mobile home park be provided
with speedy and adequate remedies
against those who abuse the terms of a
tenancy. The high cost of moving mobile
homes, the requirement of mobile home
parks relating to their installation,
and the cost of landscaping and lot
preparation necessitate that the owners
of mobile homes occupied within mobile
home parks be provided with protection
from actual or constructive eviction.
It is the purpose of this chapter to
provide protection for both the owners
of mobile homes located in mobile home
parks and . . . the owners of mobile
home parks.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-2 (1994) (emphasis added.); see also
Coleman v. Thomas, 2000 UT 53, ^19, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 12
(recognizing that the Mobile Home Park Residency Act serves the
twofold purpose of protecting park residents and park owners).
The Act specifically recognizes "the high cost of moving mobile
homes."

In this case, Brookside rejected Ms. Southworth, the

third prospective purchaser who Peebles brought to the park.

As

a result, Sam Peebles lost a sale of his mobile home for $25,000

9

in September, 1996.

(See. Appellees' Brief at 10, line 36.)

Sam

Peebles continued to pay lot rent, even though the Mobile Home
was vacant and Brookside had rejected three prospective
purchasers, including Jackie Southworth.
Finally, in November, 1997, over one year after Ms.
Southworth's rejection, the Mobile Home was finally sold and
moved to Evanston, Wyoming at a net profit of $1,423.50.
(Appellees' Brief at 11, line 43) (citation omitted). 4

This

excludes the additional $3,177.00 in lot rent Sam Pebbles had to
pay from October 25, 1996 through November 20, 1997.5
The prohibition against "unreasonably withholding" approval
for applications for residency by prospective purchasers, which
is set forth in section 57-16-4(4), was designed to protect
mobile home owners from the "high cost" of arbitrary and
capricious refusal by mobile home park owners such as Brookside.
It cost Brookside so little to be reasonable.
Peebles a great deal.

It cost Sam

Instead of selling his home for $25,000 in

4

CJL. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992)
(stating that "[t]he term 'mobile home' is somewhat misleading.
Mobile homes are largely immobile as a practical matter, because
the cost of moving one is often a significant fraction of the
value of the mobile home itself.").
5

October 25, 1996 was the closing date under the Real
Estate Purchase Contract between Peebles and Jackie Southworth
(Trial Exhibit D-67.) November 20, 1997 was the day the Mobile
Home was finally moved from the Park.
10

October, 1996, he had to move it to Evanston, Wyoming and sold it
for a net profit of $1,422.50 in November, 1997, plus he had to
continue to pay lot rent on space #100 from October, 1996 through
November, 1997.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES

The trial court erred in denying Defendants' Motion for
Costs and Attorney's Fees.

Section 57-16-8 of the Utah Code

provides that " [i]f a resident elects to contest an eviction
proceeding,...[t]he prevailing party is... entitled to court
costs and reasonable attorney's fees."

Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-8

(1994) .
A.

Peebles was a "resident" within the meaning of Section
57-16-8 because he "was an individual that leases or
rents space in a mobile home park."

Section 57-16-3(3) defines "resident" as "an individual that
leases or rents space in a mobile home park."

In Brookside's

Reply Brief, Brookside does not argue that Sam Peebles was not
paying rent for space #100.

In fact, Brookside's Exhibit A to

its Reply Brief (when the omitted second page is included) makes
that matter all the clearer.

(Brookside's Exhibit A to its Reply

Brief, with the omitted second page, is attached hereto as
Appendice A.)

After Peebles' sublessee, Richard Rowley,

abandoned the Mobile Home, Sam Peebles made the following

11

payments to Brookside for space #100, prior to service of the 5day Notice to Quit.

The following information is taken from

Brookside's own accounting ledger (attach as Appendice E to
Appellees' Brief) and the omitted second page from Brookside's
Exhibit A to its Reply Brief (attached hereto as Appendice A . ) :
Date

Amount

October 31, 1995
December 11, 1995
January 3, 1996
February 5, 1996
March 5, 1996
April 5, 1996
May 5, 1996

$591.00 (two months)
$215.00
$215.00
$215.00
$215.00
$235.00
$235.00

Thus, at the time the 5-Day Notice to Quit was served (August 10,
1996), Sam Peebles was current on rent for lot #100.6
been paying monthly lot rent since October, 1995.

He had

Although the

April 5, 1996 rent check was not cashed at that time because of
the service of the eviction notice, it had nevertheless been
tendered.
B.

The Complaint seeking to evict Peebles was an ''eviction
proceeding" within the meaning of Section 57-16-8

Furthermore, this was clearly "an eviction proceeding"

6

Brookside did not cash the April 5, 1996 check or
subsequent checks until Brookside and Peebles agreed in December,
1996, that Brookside could do so. Although the checks subsequent
to May 5, 1996 are not listed above, it is undisputed that all
rents due and owing Brookside while the Mobile Home occupied
space #100 were paid by Peebles. (See Appellees' Brief at 12,
paragraph 44.)
12

within the meaning of section 57-16-8.

(Compare Appellees' Brief

at 51-52, with Appellant's Reply Brief (providing no response to
this point)).
Brookside's only argument that Peebles is not entitled to
attorney's fees is that Peebles' argument for attorney's fees and
Peebles' argument against Brookside's request for attorney's fees
are inconsistent:
In their brief the Peebles first argue in section IV of
their brief that Brookside is not entitled to recovery
of attorney's fees in defending against the Peebles
counterclaim under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act
because Brookside's eviction proceeded under the
Unlawful Detainer Act.
The Peebles then argue the
opposite in section V of their brief that even though
Brookside proceeded to evict the Peebles under the
Unlawful Detainer Act, dismissal of such claim by the
trial court results in recovery of their attorney's
fees under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act.
(Appellant's Reply Brief at 20-21) (citations omitted).
The foregoing is Brookside's entire argument against awarding
Peebles his attorney's fees for successfully defending against
the eviction action.

This argument is flawed.

As to the

counterclaim, regardless of who the prevailing party is, there is
no basis for the prevailing party to recover attorney's fees for
the counterclaim.

(See Appellees' Brief at 46-52.)

As to the complaint, under Brookside's eviction theory,
Brookside is not entitled to attorney's fees if it prevails.
Brookside argues that Sam Peebles was a "tenant at will" within
13

the meaning of the Unlawful Detainer Act.

The Unlawful Detainer

Act, however, does not include an attorney's fees clause.
Therefore, if Brookside is successful in proving that Sam Peebles
was a "tenant at will" under the Unlawful Detainer Act, there is
no basis for Brookside to recover attorney's fees.
If Sam Peebles successfully defends against the Complaint,
then Peebles is entitled to attorneys fees under Section 57-16-8
if he is a "resident" and if this is an "eviction proceeding."
As discussed above, Sam Peebles is a "resident" within the
meaning of section 57-16-8, and this is an "eviction proceeding."
Since Peebles prevailed on the complaint below, the trial court
errored in failing to award Peebles his attorneys fees under
section 57-16-8.7
7

Although not required to recover attorneys fees, Peebles
was also an "owner" of the Mobile Home. (See the title to the
Mobile Home, attached as Appendice A to Appellees' Brief.) In
Brookside's first brief, Brookside alleged that Peebles sold his
mobile home to Richard Rowley.
(See Appellant's Brief at 6
(stating that "[t]he Peebles then sold the home to Richard Rowley
. . . . " ) ) . In Brookside's second brief, Brookside recanted that
allegation, acknowledging that Peebles only rented his mobile
home to Richard Rowley.
(See Appellant's Reply Brief at 1
(stating that "the Peebles had rented the mobile home to Richard
Rowley with an option to purchase . . . . " ) ; id. at 2 (stating
that "in renting their mobile home to Richard Rowley . . . . " ) .
As reviewed in footnote 2, page 6 of Appellees' Brief, Sam
Peebles never sold the Mobile Home to Richard Rowley. Peebles
was always an owner of the mobile home. Alan Glover, owner of
Brookside, acknowledged at trial that "Sam Peebles was in fact
the owner of the home." (T. at 50, lines 4-5.) In approximately
1987, Peebles did sell the mobile home on an installment contract
(without transferring title) to Bud Jones and Barbara Peacock,
14

CONCLUSION
This Court should overturn the jury verdict and find that
Brookside's refusal to meet with or even accept an application
for residency from Ms. Southworth is a per se violation of
section 57-16-4(4) of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, which
provides that approval of a prospective purchaser for residency
may not be "unreasonably withheld."
This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of
Defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees for successfully defending
the eviction action, and remand this case for a determination
consistent therewith, including a determination of Defendants'
attorney's fees on appeal for successfully defending on appeal
the trial court's dismissal of the eviction action.
Finally, this Court should uphold the remainder of the
Court's rulings in this case.
DATED t h i s

3\

d a y of

July,

CRIPPEN & C L I N E ,

2000.
L.C.

Russell A. Cline
Attorney for Appellees

however, they defaulted after about 6 months and Sam Peebles took
back the mobile home and signed a new lease with the Park.
(Appellees' Brief at 6, lines 8-10) (citation omitted).
Thereafter Peebles only subleased the mobile home.
15

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Reply Brief of Appellees have been mailed postage prepaid on this ^( day of July, 2000 to the following:
Dennis K. Poole
John L. Adams
Poole, Sullivan & Adams, L.C.
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Attorneys for Appellant
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APPENDICE A
(Exhibit A lo Reply of Appellant,
with omitted second page)

DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
DENNIS K. POOLE, P.C.
ANDREA NUFFER GODFREY

4543 SOUTH 700 EAST, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107
TELEPHONE (801) 263-3344
TELECOPIER (801) 263-1010

December 4, 1996

Mr. Russell A. Cline
CRIPPEN & CLINE
310 South Main, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:

Sam Peebles

Dear Mr. Cline:
This letter will confirm the stipulation made in Court this
date that Brookside Mobile Home Park will negotiate the checks
tendered by Mr. Peebles for monthly rent without prejudice to the
rights of the parties.
I am enclosing herewith for your reference copies of the
checks which we have been holding and which we are forwarding to
Brookside to deposit. You should be aware that as of December 1,
1996 a total of $2,115.00 is due and owing for rent. After
applying the checks we are holding, which total $1,370.00, there is
a balance of $745.00. Unless we receive this amount in full within
the next ten (10) days, we will file a Motion for Summary Judgment
based upon the failure to pay the lot rental.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
\ Very^ruly yours,

DENNIS K. POOLE
DKP:ec
Enc.
cc: Brookside Mobile Home Park, w/checks
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